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What You See is not What You Get:  





Weaving insights from the study of technology, operations, and organizational theory, we 
examine factors that underlie decisions about product product architecture. The general principles 
that determine the composition and interdependency between the components that make a product 
have largely been relegated to the engineering literature. However, our preliminary results from a 
Wharton-SMU study of product architecture in the imagining industry suggest several overlooked 
factors that play an important role in determining product architecture and consequently – firm 
performance. We suggest that product architecture decisions are far from being the exclusive domain 
of engineers. Using a sample of firms and products from the imaging sector, we distinguish between 
the engineering product architecture and perceived product architecture and note that they can be 
decoupled. Second, we seek to determine how firm choices regarding the design architecture can be 
mapped explained using variables such as firm prestige and customer sophistication. 
 
Keywords: Product Architecture, Strategy, Cognition,  
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The literature on product architecture1 has progressed to create a universal language 
describing the principles that guide product design. It identified four product architecture archetypes 
– integral, slot, bus, and sectional – that can be used to describe almost any product, however humble or 
complex it may be (Ulrich, 1995). Those archetypes differ on the degree of interdependency of 
components and how they relate to each other. For instance, in integral design, such as that of a 
disposable ballpoint pen, all of the components fit tightly and idiosyncratically with one another. 
The product is self-contained, its parts are highly interrelated, and the entire design is tightly 
coupled. Such design has some advantages: it can simplify manufacturing processes, it presents the 
consumer with neatly packaged product, and it makes it difficult for competitors to offer after-
market or add-ons. The biggest drawback of such design lies in its inhospitality to change. At the 
component level, because they are tightly related, even a minute change in the design of one 
component will require a review and possible change in all of the other components. 
Organizationally, that review and possible change has commensurate repercussions on the way 
people inside and outside firm align their activities. The interfaces may be mapped onto the design 
of the firm and determine the interdependencies among its parts. The interdependencies need to be 
coordinated and whenever the design architecture becomes transformed, so does the corresponding 
repertoire of coordination routines (compare Christensen and Rosenblom, 1995)  
In bus design, the second design archetype we will discuss here, all the components fit into  a 
central interface that connects them to each other. While the connection to the bus may be 
idiosyncratic, the components co-function without being connected directly to each other. Rather, 
they all connect to the bus, not to each other. Thus, a removal or addition of a component does not 
                                                 
1 Management scholars have discussed general principles of design for quite some time, covering not only physical 
products, but also such institutions as contracting and government (Baldwin & Clark). Our usage here is congruent with 
that common in the engineering and operation literature, where scholars speak of “product architecture” (Ulrich). Both 
usages are different from the common use of “design”, which has to do with the choice of such characteristics as shape 
and material. They are also unlike the common use of architecture, which has to do with construction style. 
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require a redesign of the entire product. Hence, for instance, one can remove a hard drive from a 
desktop computer and replace it with a DVD drive. While the two components are different, they 
are identical in the way they connect to the computer bus and interact with the other components, 
such as the central processing unit and memory. Similarly, one can disconnect a set of speakers from 
a high-end stereo amplifier and replace them with other speakers without making any changes to the 
amplifier or the other components in the system. As long as the new speakers feature the same 
interface as the prior ones, their other characteristics as irrelevant to the functioning system. Bus 
design is not an entirely modular design, because each component must be connected to the bus 
through a specific interface. Components that do not feature that interface cannot be connected to 
the system. For instance, speakers that feature an optical interface, where sound data are transmitted 
through pulses of light, cannot be connected to an amplifier that does not feature such interface.  
Just like any design archetype, bus design has its merits and drawbacks. For one, it allows for greater 
flexibility in customization of a product. By stocking just few alternative components, a computer 
manufacturer can offer a great variety of combinations of hard drives and DVD drives, for instance.  
Finally, sectional product architecture is based around complete modularity, where 
components can be added or removed freely, in a Lego-like manner. Such would be the case with a 
modular shelving system that can accommodate shelves of various lengths and width or stacks of 
drawers or filing cabinets, or a combination thereof. While few products are belong purely to one 
category, it is useful to perverse those categories for analytical purposes. 
Students of technology have long been aware of the vast implication of product architecture 
choices, and have engaged in a lively discussion on the proper fit between products or services and 
their architecture Sako (2004, 2005) among others has been prominent in examining the architecture 
of products and services, and the challenges they entail when firms seek to partially outsource the 
design or production of certain components. As one may expect, however, this literature has 
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maintained a strong engineering focus and rarely ventured beyond consideration of product function 
and costs associated with sourcing, manufacturing, and servicing into such considerations as 
strategic and organizational considerations as product differentiation or organizational. design. Our 
data on the evolution of the imaging industry, supplemented with data from consumer electronic 
products, suggest that a taking broader view produces new strategic insights. 
What has largely escaped discussion is the notion that product design can have important 
competitive consequences. The bus archetype has been hailed for its advantages in simplifying the 
engineering process and allowing product customization at lower cost. However, its unheeded 
adoption can have detrimental consequences for corporate strategy. This is because it allows users to 
purchase add-on components or swap original components, thus reducing the original manufacturer 
stream of revenue and potentially compromising product integrity.  
This hazard is epitomized in products that derive profits from the Razor Blade model, 
allegedly invented by King C. Gillette, where the initial product may be sold at a low profit margin, 
but guarantees a stream of profits from selling high profit margin replacement parts (Tripsas & 
Gavetti, 2000; Wikipedia). In the Gillette case, it meant selling low cost razors and profiting from 
the high margins obtained on the replacement razors, without which the product quickly becomes 
useless. Another example is printer ink cartridges, which, just like razor blades, require periodical 
replacement. Because cartridges are connected to the printer in a discernable interface, third party 
manufacturers have been able to offer alternative cartridges that fit in the printer just like those 
made by the original manufacturer. By purchasing from such alternative sources, consumers can 
circumvent the Razor Blade model and undermine the manufacturer strategy. So high are the stakes 
around such strategy that the introduction of third party components has led to an on-going series 
of legal challenges, which focus on whether the manufacturing of such add-on product infringes on 
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the copyright on the original designer. So far, US courts have denied the claim (e.g. , "Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc."). 
Whenever a sector becomes increasingly modular in the mode in which products converge 
towards certain standards the more compelling it becomes for manufacturers to settle on 
architectural competencies while leaving the development and production of components to 
strategic partners. The implication is that firms ought to accumulate design skills and social capital to 
build a network of firms held together by long term, trust based alliances.  
We argue that advantage of integral design emanates not only from the engineering 
considerations noted above, but also from the place such design occupies in consumers’ mind. Our 
data suggest that unsophisticated consumers prefer integral product architecture. Firms could reap 
rewards from combining perceptual advantages the appearance of integral design with the 
manufacturing advantages bus (or sectional) design. A challenge for firms is to design and produce a 
modular architecture that notwithstanding its sectional properties has an integral appearance in the 
market place. 
We use Janus-faced, after the Roman deity Janus, to describe the two contrasting aspects of 
products that simultaneously possess an appearance of integral product design while their 
engineering underlying are based on bus (or sectional) product design. The process of production 
does not necessarily signal the way buyers ought to observe the properties of a product. Questions 
we should address include the matter of customer perception of product architectural design 
(compare Winter, 1984 on technologies that can be observed and those that are hidden to 
“outsiders.”). Some technologies, such as open source innovation (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003), 
are highly visible and become shared among the participants (Levine, 2001), while others are 
proprietary, cloaked trade secrets and by tight intellectual property arrangements.  
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Method 
While we developed understanding of the role product architecture plays in engineering and 
operations, we know less about its potentially important role in firm strategy, including its effect on 
firm status or the way it affect consumer perception. The rarity of previous research and the lack of 
firm theoretical framing have led us to adopt qualitative research methods, which are more 
appropriate for the inductive development of theory, when meaning, process, context, and 
unanticipated phenomena are uncovered and explained (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). Qualitative methods are suitable for theoretical development, as they may lead to the 
discovery of a novel construct or unknown link between existing constructs.  
Following the qualitative research method literature, we chose a maximum variation 
sampling technique (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Maxwell, 1996). In this configuration, a researcher 
specifically chooses sites that are likely to be quite different from each other, in order to use the 
variance for generating rules about the relationships between variables. We have done the same by 
sampling multiple industry sectors. We also collected data in multiple industry sectors, several 
countries and geographical regions, and across positions and hierarchical ranks. This wide and 
exploratory effort allowed us to discover the contingent framework that we present here.    
Choice of Sites 
We were drawn to two industries that evolved rapidly in recent years, because of our interest 
in industry evolution (results reported elsewhere). Hence, we chose to focus on photographic 
equipment. We also use a case from of a mobile music player (also known as MP3 players, after the 
compression algorithm implemented in them). The photographic equipment industry has undergone 
a fundamental shift as the image-capturing medium has evolved from analog (film) to digital 
(charge-coupled device or CCD). It has been apparent not only in consumer-grade equipment, 
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where digital cameras have reached complete domination, but also in professional, military, and 
medical applications. A similar shift has taken place in the market for mobile music players, where 
the media have shifted from analog (e.g. cassette-based Walkman) and optical (compact disk player) 
to memory and hard disk based devices. Prominent in this market is Apple iPod, who commands a 
75% market share (Wingfield, 2006), which we used to demonstrate the generalizability of our ideas. 
As commonly done in qualitative research, we began collecting data in an exploratory mode: 
with interest in product architecture but without specific hypotheses, as to allow hypotheses to 
emerge from the data. To allow for within-firm variance and to increase inter-site reliability, we 
designed the study using a qualitative maximum variation sampling approach, which prescribes sampling 
from potentially different sub-populations in order to identify differences and increase inter-site 
reliability (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Maxwell, 1996). We achieved that by collecting data in multiple 
industry sectors, several countries and geographical regions, and across positions and hierarchical 
ranks. This wide and exploratory effort allowed us to discover the contingent framework that we 
present here. To allow for cross-validation, we employed not only single interviews, but also a 
variety of other data collection tools, such as repeated interviews, document analysis, and informal 
conversations (Maxwell, 1996). The preliminary data reported here was collected in five months, 
during which we conducted dozens of interviews, visited company locations, and attended industry 
conference and seminar. Field notes about observations and informal interviews extended over 
dozens of pages.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Following established methods of grounded theory development, the study was conducted 
in four phases, from preparation to theory building (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman, 
1984; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In the pre-study phase, we prepared by reading industry trade 
journals, articles in the business press, academic and case studies about the industry. We spent time 
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identifying and contacting informants. To increase variance in qualitative sampled, we approached a 
variety of informants. We called on engineers, chief executive officers, industry experts, and 
journalists. We presented our interest and research plan, and asked whether they would be interested 
in cooperation. As those confirmed their willingness, we deepened our understanding of the firms 
involved by reviewing a variety of information sources, such as press articles, financial reports, and 
sales materials.  
Phase One: Fieldwork 
Phase one consisted of data collection in the field, using interviews, repeated interviews, 
document analysis, and informal conversations.  
Informant Recruiting 
Following the maximum variation sampling design, we recruited informants through several 
channels. First, we used our familiarity with the industry and approached some informants directly, 
contacted them by telephone and requested and requested a meeting. Once we recruited an 
informant, we asked her or him to introduce us to their colleagues, supervisors, and subordinates, if 
appropriate. Second, we scanned our institutional database to identify alumni employed in the focal 
industry. Third, we approached some informants based on referrals from our acquaintances or other 
informants. Fourth, we attended a large industry conference and seminar, where we approached and 
recruited informants. 
 We believe that the combination of sampling approaches – direct request, database, 
snowball, and on-site – helped to limit selection bias in the interviewee population (Maxwell, 1996; 
Miles & Huberman, 1984; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). A request to meet was denied only once, when 
we approached a contracting manufacturing firm.  
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Interviews 
Interviews were open-ended, moderately directive, and mostly aimed at producing a fine-
detailed description of activities in the informant professional area. The only exception was the 
series of interview of a veteran journalist, where we used his expertise to discuss specific industry 
occurrences and trends. Commonly, interviewees described a process they were involved in, such as 
the selection of equipment for procurement, the development of a new model, or the contracting of 
a sub-component. Since we were interested in product architecture, we probed related issues, but 
only if those surfaced during the interview. For example, to elicit a detailed account, we sometimes 
asked the interviewees about a specific occurrence they took part in, and ask them to take us 
through the entire process. Then, if a relevant occurrence was mentioned (e.g., “We decided to 
outsource development and production of our lenses to a lens manufacturer”), we would ask further 
about it using nondirective terms (such as “Can you take us through how the decision was made?” 
or “Would you tell us more about it?”). In other cases, we had previous knowledge that the 
interviewee had had a relevant professional experience, e.g. was involved in the development of a 
first digital camera. We then encouraged them to give a thorough account of the experience, starting 
from the very moment they began to work on it and ending in the present.  
Interviews lasted between thirty minutes and two hours, with an average of an hour per 
interview. Most of the interviews were recorded; minority of them was documented through 
extensive field notes that were elaborated after the interview. In line with ethical standards of 
informed consent (American Sociological Association, 2001), we reiterated to the informants that 
the meeting was voluntary, assured that the discussion would be kept strictly confidential, and asked 
for permission to record it. In no interview has an interviewee requested to stop recording. 
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Observations and Informal Conversations 
We collected data not only through interviews but also through informal conversations. This 
was the major method for data collection when we attend two industry events, part of the industry’s 
main trade show, which we were invited by two of the informants. Together, we spent roughly 33 
hours collecting data informally. We arrived to the tradeshow grounds in early in the morning’s 
hours and spent there at least eight hours daily, until it was closed for the night. We scheduled one 
or two formal interviews a day, leaving most of the time for informal interactions.  
We engaged in conversations with attendants and exhibitors, recruited informants, and 
collected documents, which were later analyzed. We took field notes recording such informal 
discussions and observations, as well as documents we read. We took notes and recorded artifacts 
with a digital camera, using those as data points in the subsequent analysis. Speaking informally, 
without recording or visibly taking notes, allowed us to converse in a more relaxed atmosphere and 
confirm things we heard in the interviews. It also provided leads into data and events that were not 
mentioned in the interview because we simply did not know to ask about it.  
Compared to other researchers who spent their entire study on one site, we chose to collect 
data in multiple sites sequentially. Interviews took place in three European countries and in the 
United States. This was a natural outcome of our decision to maximize variance sampling, and it 
enables us to make an argument about the industry, rather than about a specific firm or firms in it.  
Phase Two: Interpretation 
In phase two, we developed a formed interpretation of the data. Most of the interviews were 
recorded were recorded and then transcribed by an assistant or us. In addition to the transcription, 
we used the recording to assure accuracy and add information about voice tone and conversational 
pauses (Weiss, 1994). To the body of the interviews, we added our notes about the interviews. The 
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field notes, detailing observations and informal discussions, were also typed. In addition, we 
collected evidence from documents of and about firms and the industry, as described earlier. 
Analysis of the data began almost as early as we embarked on the data collection effort. 
Using qualitative analysis software (Bazeley & Richards, 2000; Burgess, 1995), we carefully examined 
each datum and assigned it to several categories. Data were coded shortly after they were entered. As 
data accumulated, we often refined categories by splitting them into sub-categories and recoding the 
data into those categories. For instance, a category initially called “difficulty in moving from analog 
to digital” was split to indicate whether the difficulties were the result of engineering setbacks or of 
consumer perception. The quick growth of latter sub-category has led us to look in greater depth of 
those instances, which eventually led to the identification of the strategic role played by product 
design. 
The process of coding data continued throughout the months of fieldwork and grew in 
intensity in the hiatus between periods of fieldwork. As evidence accumulated, phenomena were 
linked into patterns, and those were linked together in a framework. As data amassed, we kept 
updating the framework by adding, dropping, and tweaking it.  
Phase Three: Validation 
In phase three, we worked to increase validity and reliability by presenting an early version of 
the findings to informants and industry experts. We discussed the findings with industry observers 
and other researchers who worked on similar topics. The discussions with key informants revealed 
few errors in the data we used. The reactions we observed suggested that the findings were neither 
obvious nor universally present in firms. While the qualitative nature of the data limits claim to 
generalizability, we believe that the risk of invalidity is low, given the breadth and variance of the 
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sample, the crosschecking of interviews, informal conversations and observations, and the feedback 
in the validation phase. 
Findings and Analysis 
First, we use the case of Apple’s iPod to demonstrate how firms can decouple perceived 
design from engineering design, using a Janus-faced design architecture, which satisfies lay 
consumers’ preferences for integral design while reaping the benefits of bus or sectional design. 
Second, we show that similar products can be built using markedly different product architecture, by 
using data from our investigation of camera makers. We then proceed to hypothesize that firm 
choice of architectural design can be mapped to the degree of sophistication of its consumers as well 
as its place in the industry’s status hierarchy. 
Janus-faced product architecture. To illustrate the nature of Janus-faced product 
architecture, we turn Apple’s iPod, a mobile music player. When debuted in 2001, the 6.5-ounce, 
stainless steel device, which was about the size of a deck of cards, could carry 1,000 digital 
recordings on its five-gigabyte hard drive. Apple heralded it as the “unveiling of a breakthrough 
digital device”, a claim that was met with skepticism with industry observers, as the marketplace for 
such players was already crowded with offerings from other companies (Pogue, 2001). Financial 
analysts warned that Apple might be erring by venturing into the low-margin consumer electronics 
business and conjectured that the main contribution of the iPod would be in driving sales of the 
company’s Macintosh line of computers (Tam, 2001). 
Five years later, the iPod has become the subject of numerous admiring articles in the 
managerial and popular press, described in such terms as “innovative” (Yoffie & Slind, 2006) or a 
“perfect example” of “breakthrough offering” (Silverberg, 2005). Jack Walsh, the former executive 
chief or General Electric has used the iPod example to preach the virtues of American innovation to 
foreign audiences (Jin-Seo, 2006). Further, the iPod has arguably become an icon, whose influence is 
described in the popular media to possess “fanatical devotion”, it is said to spun its own economy 
with “companies that cater to the faithful” and create cultural trends (della Cava, 2005). Indeed, the 
iPod influence has been described in gargantuan terms: “the iPod has changed our behavior and 
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even our society. It has transformed Apple from a computer company into a consumer electronics 
giant. It has remolded the music business, altering not only the means of distribution but even the 
ways in which people enjoy and think about music. Its ubiquity and its universally acknowledged 
coolness have made it a symbol for the digital age itself, with commentators remarking on ‘the iPod 
generation’”(Levy, 2006). 
Given its status, it is surprising that almost none of iPod components are produced or even 
designed by Apple. A close inspection reveals that Apple assembled components that are generic, 
licensed or have been available in the marketplace for a while. Although the specifics of Apple 
relationships with its suppliers are closely guarded by the company, independent reviews suggest that 
the iPod processor is produced by Portal Player while its operating software is licensed from Pixo. 
The tiny hard disk that lies in the heart of the product is made by Toshiba, the battery is sourced 
from Sony and other manufectures, and the liquid crystal display is said to be made by LG, a 
consumer electronics maker, as well as other manufacturers. One of the few components made or 
designed by Apple is the FireWire bus, which interfaces data transfer between the disparate 
components (Day, 2005; Walker, 2003). 
Insert (iPod architecture scheme) about here 
Why do consumers view a collection of outsourced components as “sleek” or “elegant”, 
perceiving it to be a culturally and economically transforming invention? We suggest that while 
architecturally it is clearly based on bus design, the iPod is perceived as product that features integral 
design. Hence, 
H1: The perception of product architecture can be decoupled from its engineering 
architecture 
Decoupling design from perception is a significant achievement, because the ability of a firm 
to infuse its products with an integral identity hinges very much on the degree to which the requisite 
structures themselves -- internal or external -- are seamless (Henderson & Clark, 1990). If the 
relationship between the makers of the various components that go into a product are not seamless 
the consumer is likely to see them as being uncoupled and perceive its performance to be deficient.   
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This is true because firms can manufacturer the similar products using markedly different designs. 




Choices of product architecture. We now turn to our data on the product design of 
products in several segments of camera manufacturers to show how similar products can have 
markedly different product architectures. Every camera, regardless of its technological sophistication 
or price level, contains three basic elements: 1) lens, which focuses the light on the 2) capturing 
device, which can be film holder or digital unit (CCD), and an 3) enclosure that houses these two 
elements together with other optional elements, such as light meter or strobe (flash). This structure 
has remained unchanged from the Camera Obscura of the 1700s to the high-end professional digital 
cameras of the present. 
Insert (camera scheme) about here 
These components are universally present in cameras. Naturally, their specifications differ 
according to the use of the camera. Most importantly for our purpose, the product architecture of a 
camera can range fro integral to sectional. Many simple point-and-shoot cameras contain all of the 
elements in a single, compact enclosure. When a consumer purchase a camera, she buys a bundle of 
a lens, capturing device, and an enclosure, all usually carry the same brand name. As expected in 
integral design, the components are tightly related, and one cannot replace the lens without replacing 
the entire camera. Bus architecture in camera design is exemplified in a single-lens-reflector (SLR) 
camera. These cameras, larger and more expensive, decouple the lens component from the other 
components. Therefore, a consumer can purchase just a “body”, i.e. an enclosure that includes a 
capturing device. Then, depends on the intended use of the camera, the purchaser can choose from 
a variety of lenses, such as those intended for landscape, wildlife, or portrait work. The lenses are 
made by the camera manufacturer or a number of independent makers, purchased separately, and 
connect to the camera body through an electronic data connection, i.e. a type of bus, which 
transmits data between them. 
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Finally, sectional architecture in camera is exemplified in professional grade cameras. Known 
as medium-format and large-format cameras, and used in photography studios and other 
commercial applications, these cameras allow user to replace the lens and capturing device as 
necessary, swapping and matching a lens, capturing media, and a camera body as needed. Thus, for 
instance, a user can combine lens suitable for portraiture and capture the image on black and white 
film, and instantaneously swap these components to lens suitable for close-up image and capture the 
image digitally. 
We use cameras to demonstrate how a given product can appear in several product design 
architectures. Point-and-shoot cameras follow integral design, single-lens-reflector cameras follow 
bus design, and medium/large format cameras follow sectional design. As the iPod case 
demonstrated, firms can decouple a product’s perceived design from its engineering design. Hence, 
firms have a decision space to determine how a product should be engineered and how it should be 
communicated to consumers. What determines those decisions? In addition to engineering 
considerations, we hypothesize that they are dependent on consumers’ preferences and on the firm’s 
status. 
Consumer Preferences and Firm Status. Different architectural designs are preferred by 
consumers groups that are distinguished by their degree of sophistication. While lay consumers 
gravitate towards the simple products of integral design, hobbyists and professional prefer the 
flexibility and customization possibilities associated with bus and sectional design.  
H2a: The less sophisticated a consumer segment is, the greater the preference for product 
architecture that is closer to integral design. 
H2b: The more sophisticated a consumer segment is, the greater the preference for product 
architecture that is closer to sectional design. 
Next we turn to the concept of firm status to inform about the ability of firms to achieve 
product integration at high quality as communicated through status, whether legacy or current. Low 
status firms face unfavorable production functions and endure negative channel dynamics while high 
status firms cannot only produce more cheaply but also charge premia for their output. They also 
face the threat of status leakage when they transact with low status firms. Polodny (2005; , 1993) 
argues that interaction between unequal actors affect both sides’ status. While the lower-status actor 
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benefits from being associated with a higher-status actor, the latter suffers decreased status from 
such interaction. Hence, high-status actors seek to limit such interaction, while low-status actors 
seek it.. We apply this logic to argue that the higher a firm’s prestige, the greater its ability and the 
lower the threshold for achieving a high degree of architectural integration with a strong sense of 
product unity. We hypothesize that high status firms will seek avoid association with lower status 
firms, and will labor to create a perception of integral design, even if their product is bus (or 
sectional), as in the iPod case. In contrast, low status firms will seek association with higher status 
firms by including components and will gravitate towards bus or sectional design. This leaves as 
undesirable the combinations of low firm status-integral design and high firm status-sectional design. 
H3a: When facing a combination of lay consumers and high status, a firm will perform 
better in gravitating towards integral design. 
H3b: When facing a combination of sophisticated consumers and low status, a firm will 
perform better in gravitating towards sectional design. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
A profound paradox exist in the quest for a market preference for integral design and a, 
coordinative, efficiency based sectional design. On the one hand, we posit a presence of market 
segmentation along the dimension of customer sophistication and product perception from integral 
to sectional. On the other hand, we argue that firms can be arrayed along a dimension of status 
ranging from low to high prestige (J. M. Podolny, 1993) (Roberts, 1998;  Podolny, 1993). The 
challenge of firms to achieve product offerings that match the consumers preference for integral 
designs is paradoxical since sophisticated or knowledgeable customers, such as lead users (von 
Hippel, 1986, 2005) prefer sectional over integral designs. Lay, i.e. naïve and unsophisticated 
consumers prefer integral designs. By contrast, high status firms who are expected to target 
knowledgeable consumers, lean towards product architectures that embody bus or sectional design 
while low status firms, catering to lay consumers, lean towards integral product architectures. The 
implication is that high status firms face significant barriers to open their innovation towards those 
customer segments that are most knowledgeable.  
  18
Implications and Conclusion 
For firms involved, these combinations suggest certain strategic modalities. As the inroads of 
semiconductor technology into the photographic sector have rendered it products increasingly 
modular, their decision whether to “make or buy” will increasingly  require them to accumulate 
social capital to implement  alliances with firms that will embellish their status, assuming that status 
is a signal of quality for which firms  receive premia. That social capital enables high status firms  to 
guard their integrity (compare Podolny, 2005) lest their status will leak. Likewise, as Nickerson and  
Silverman (2003) indicates, firms endure higher transaction costs (or their delivery of output is 
costlier) when insourcing activities such as trucking , they face the dilemma of low versus high status 
as conveyed by whether firms operate as  owner operators rather than as employees of large trucking 
chains.  
We would, therefore, expect   the photographic equipment manufacturers to partner with 
component (e.g. lens, flash, bag, CCD)  suppliers who enjoy the status to match their OEM and 
ODM. Firms might enhance their status when they partner with high status  suppliers, as illustrated 
by Panasonic and Zeiss Ikon. Interestingly, large spreads are observed among component prices, 
depending on the branding that is attached to the component.  
At this stage, we are not yet ready to provide conclusive evidence for product design 
architecture, firm status,  and the exchange relationships that emerge among alliances of firms which 
contract to design and manufacture photographic equipment.  More data collection and analysis is to 
be completed. The arguments so far suggest, however, interesting ideas for pushing the insights 
regarding strategic alliances in sectors where insourcing and outsourcing is rampant and new firms 
of organization, whether virtual or otherwise are becoming prominent (e.g., Li, 2007, Sako, 2006). 
Our field study of photography shows ample evidence about insourcing becoming the dominant 
form of organizing—both for the design of components and architecture as well as their 
manufacturing,  In fact insourcing and outsourcing appear to be even more common in the 
photographic sector than in sectors such as vehicle manufacturing and computing or 
telecommunication equipment. Yet,  the knowledge to date remains incomplete regarding the 
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governance of interfirm relationships and the sort of product architecture that can be mapped onto 
those exchange relationships. 
Sako (2003) showed that among vehicle (MV) manufacturers in Japan (Toyota, Nissan and 
Honda) major variations exist around the coordination and knowledge transfer between these firms 
and their outsourcing partners.  Toyota appears to behave more aggressively in the transfer of tacit 
knowledge onto their partners thus assuring a greater seamlessness between the components that 
make up its architecture. In her comparative case study, she finds that Nissan and Honda appear to 
behave more modestly when it involves the sharing of proprietary practices as distinct from 
“teaching” or representation of what often looms to be tacit knowledge such as the Toyota 
production system and its quality management. One would also expect the status of these firms and 
their suppliers to produce differences in firm performance and to reveal heterogeneity in product 
architecture. The management of exchange relationships within MVs has not reached the 
institutionalized similarity among the firms, thus inviting questions regarding competitive advantages 
and speed of innovation. The photographic sector might provide still another stage in which 
patterns of inter-firm interaction, in relation to product design inform us about the intricate 
relationships between product architecture, and the status among the insourcing and outsourcing 
firms. 
 
The following propositions derive from the arguments. 
 
1. As sectors  witness a paradigm shift, the status legacy of their incumbents carries 
forward after the disruptive technology has replaced the established technology 
2. Status constitute one of the major  complementary assets that incumbent firms  
leverage in their strategic efforts as their sector transitions into a new technology and market 
3. High status firms, compared to their low status peers enjoy a bargaining advantage 
when partnering with firms possessing complementary assdets 
4. An incongruence exists among sectional versus integral product-market focus 
derived from customer sophistication and producer status. 
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5. High status firms produce modular equipment whose architecture suggests an 
integral configuration.  
6. High status firms form close and embedded alliances with high status partners; low 
status firms form arms-length relationships with their suppliers 
7.  High status firms engage in “evolutionary capability” (capability for capability 
building—Sako, 2004)  towards their insourcing partners, while low status firms resort to a more 
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Figure XXX: iPod Architectural Design Scheme
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